https://github.com/ZcashFoundation/GrantProposals-2017Q4/issues/24#issuecomment-337991126
" We have started labeling the claims of block rewards, as they are the most obvious transactions between t and z addresses, and found that these transaction take up over 87% (98K transactions) of all transactions from a t-address to a z-address. This trend has been decreasing, as for the last 10K blocks this ratio is only 80% (4500 transactions)."
Thank you Monero development team to make privacy a default (RingCT for all transactions and a minimum ring size as reasonable based on current level of range proof optimizations)
Also interesting:
"We have also looked into the usage of JoinSplit transactions, and found that from all the transactions (1,400K transactions overall) about 19.4% are JoinSplit transaction (272K transactions), and from the JoinSplit transactions 1.7% (4.7K transactions) are pure z-to-z address transactions (i.e. it does not involve any t address)."
Note that Zcash enforces coinbase transactions to be JoinSplit, i.e., mining rewards (coinbase trasnactions) can only be transferred (send) to a z-address.
The comment has to do with zcash trusted setup; if the setup was compromised, an attacker could produce unlimited Z-coins wihout anyone ever knowing about it
When monero are created, their amount is shown, and the 1st TX using them hides their amount. It can be mathematically proven that it's not possible to create monero out of thin air in the proces of transacting with hidden amounts. That's why it's important that mathematical proof be air-tight. First variant of RCT range proof had a flaw in the proof, and thankfully it was captured before it made it into production. monero.stackexchange...em-with-asnl-forgery
With Z-cash, the possibility exists in the math itself - it's not a bug, it's the way it works (until a better solution is found). The set-up info should be destroyed. Since it's not possible to prove that you DON'T know something, we can never know for sure that the set-up was ok.
" We have started labeling the claims of block rewards, as they are the most obvious transactions between t and z addresses, and found that these transaction take up over 87% (98K transactions) of all transactions from a t-address to a z-address. This trend has been decreasing, as for the last 10K blocks this ratio is only 80% (4500 transactions)."
Thank you Monero development team to make privacy a default (RingCT for all transactions and a minimum ring size as reasonable based on current level of range proof optimizations)
Also interesting:
"We have also looked into the usage of JoinSplit transactions, and found that from all the transactions (1,400K transactions overall) about 19.4% are JoinSplit transaction (272K transactions), and from the JoinSplit transactions 1.7% (4.7K transactions) are pure z-to-z address transactions (i.e. it does not involve any t address)."
Note that Zcash enforces coinbase transactions to be JoinSplit, i.e., mining rewards (coinbase trasnactions) can only be transferred (send) to a z-address.
The comment has to do with zcash trusted setup; if the setup was compromised, an attacker could produce unlimited Z-coins wihout anyone ever knowing about it
When monero are created, their amount is shown, and the 1st TX using them hides their amount. It can be mathematically proven that it's not possible to create monero out of thin air in the proces of transacting with hidden amounts. That's why it's important that mathematical proof be air-tight. First variant of RCT range proof had a flaw in the proof, and thankfully it was captured before it made it into production. monero.stackexchange...em-with-asnl-forgery
With Z-cash, the possibility exists in the math itself - it's not a bug, it's the way it works (until a better solution is found). The set-up info should be destroyed. Since it's not possible to prove that you DON'T know something, we can never know for sure that the set-up was ok.
