OPEN-SOURCE SCRIPT

Sharpe Ratio Forced Selling Strategy

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This study introduces the “Sharpe Ratio Forced Selling Strategy”, a quantitative trading model that dynamically manages positions based on the rolling Sharpe Ratio of an asset’s excess returns relative to the risk-free rate. The Sharpe Ratio, first introduced by Sharpe (1966), remains a cornerstone in risk-adjusted performance measurement, capturing the trade-off between return and volatility. In this strategy, entries are triggered when the Sharpe Ratio falls below a specified low threshold (indicating excessive pessimism), and exits occur either when the Sharpe Ratio surpasses a high threshold (indicating optimism or mean reversion) or when a maximum holding period is reached.

The underlying economic intuition stems from institutional behavior. Institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, are often subject to risk management mandates and performance benchmarking, requiring them to reduce exposure to assets that exhibit deteriorating risk-adjusted returns over rolling periods (Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013). When risk-adjusted performance improves, institutions may rebalance or liquidate positions to meet regulatory requirements or internal mandates, a behavior that can be proxied effectively through a rising Sharpe Ratio.

By systematically monitoring the Sharpe Ratio, the strategy anticipates when “forced selling” pressure is likely to abate, allowing for opportunistic entries into assets priced below fundamental value. Exits are equally mechanized, either triggered by Sharpe Ratio improvements or by a strict time-based constraint, acknowledging that institutional rebalancing and window-dressing activities are often time-bound (Coval and Stafford, 2007).

The Sharpe Ratio is particularly suitable for this framework due to its ability to standardize excess returns per unit of risk, ensuring comparability across timeframes and asset classes (Sharpe, 1994). Furthermore, adjusting returns by a dynamically updating short-term risk-free rate (e.g., US 3-Month T-Bills from FRED) ensures that macroeconomic conditions, such as shifting interest rates, are accurately incorporated into the risk assessment.

While the Sharpe Ratio is an efficient and widely recognized measure, the strategy could be enhanced by incorporating alternative or complementary risk metrics:

• Sortino Ratio: Unlike the Sharpe Ratio, the Sortino Ratio penalizes only downside volatility (Sortino and van der Meer, 1991). This would refine entries and exits to distinguish between “good” and “bad” volatility.

• Maximum Drawdown Constraints: Integrating a moving window maximum drawdown filter could prevent entries during persistent downtrends not captured by volatility alone.

• Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR): A measure of expected shortfall beyond the Value at Risk, CVaR could further constrain entry conditions by accounting for tail risk in extreme environments (Rockafellar and Uryasev, 2000).

• Dynamic Thresholds: Instead of static Sharpe thresholds, one could implement dynamic bands based on the historical distribution of the Sharpe Ratio, adjusting for volatility clustering effects (Cont, 2001).

Each of these risk parameters could be incorporated into the current script as additional input controls, further tailoring the model to different market regimes or investor risk appetites.

References

• Cont, R. (2001) ‘Empirical properties of asset returns: stylized facts and statistical issues’, Quantitative Finance, 1(2), pp. 223-236.

• Coval, J.D. and Stafford, E. (2007) ‘Asset Fire Sales (and Purchases) in Equity Markets’, Journal of Financial Economics, 86(2), pp. 479-512.

• Greenwood, R. and Scharfstein, D. (2013) ‘The Growth of Finance’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(2), pp. 3-28.

• Rockafellar, R.T. and Uryasev, S. (2000) ‘Optimization of Conditional Value-at-Risk’, Journal of Risk, 2(3), pp. 21-41.

• Sharpe, W.F. (1966) ‘Mutual Fund Performance’, Journal of Business, 39(1), pp. 119-138.

• Sharpe, W.F. (1994) ‘The Sharpe Ratio’, Journal of Portfolio Management, 21(1), pp. 49-58.

• Sortino, F.A. and van der Meer, R. (1991) ‘Downside Risk’, Journal of Portfolio Management, 17(4), pp. 27-31.

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